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Reply Brief of Appellant
Argument
I.

All Issues Presented for Appeal Were Preserved In the Record
For the first time in this litigation-including the briefing before the Utah

Court of Appeals and the Petition for Certiorari-Guarantors claim that the entirety
of this appeal was unpreserved. See Supreme Court Brief Appellant, 15-19.
While this position plays opportunistically on the Court of Appeals decision, it
contrasts sharply with Guarantors' positions taken previously. The preservation
issue is simply not well taken and the Court of Appeals erred in holding
otherwise. Moreover, the parties briefing establishes the extent to which they
believed any issue had been not been preserved. The substantive issues on
appeal, were preserved for meaningful appellate review.
This Court held in Patterson v. Patterson. 2011 UT 68,

P.3d

, that

preservation of issues of appeal is a prudential issue. Patterson. U 13. The core
purpose of preservation-providing an opportunity for the district court to rule on an
issue- has been met in this case, id-1112. The best indication of this fact is that
in the Substantive Briefing before the Court of Appeals neither party raised a
preservation issue, though the Court of Appeals ultimately ruled on that issue.
To the contrary, Guarantors raised the preservation of appeals issue only
in a very limited fashion. Guarantors asserted in their Brief that the Lenders third
issue, whether the Trial Court erred in granting Summary Judgment in light of
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Guarantors express waiver of the defensive impairment of collateral, was not
preserved for appeal. Guarantors' Court of Appeals Brief, 3. Lender responded by
demonstrating that this issue had in fact been raised in the record below, citing
briefing in Guarantors' Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment and in support of Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment,
R.407. Lender's Court of Appeals Reply Brief, 5-7. Lender expressly pointed out
the express waivers in the guarantees, in the record R.509-10. Lender's Court of
Appeals Reply Brief, 5-7.
The briefing before the Court of Appeals lays bare the parties beliefs and
positions with respect to preservation. First, it was not an issue that was simply
ignored. The parties grappled with preservation where they believe it was a
potentially applicable doctrine. Second, neither party believed that preservation
had anything like the preclusive effect the Court of Appeals applied. Finally, both
parties expressly explained to the Court of Appeals that they intended to
preserve, not preclude issues for appeal.
The Guarantors acknowledged in their reply memorandum to supplemental
brief before the Court of Appeals that "The Findings and Conclusions, however, is
a significant document that in essence was an acknowledgment by the parties of
what the Court had rule in the Memorandum Decision and what the parties
expected that the Court would find and conclude on the remaining issues for trial,
the commercial reasonableness of the collateral sale by Prinsburg." Guarantors'
-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Reply Memorandum to Supplemental Brief of Appellant, Court of Appeals, 1. The
Guarantors further acknowledged that they "understood that Prinsburg would
likely appeal the Trial Court's determination in the Memorandum Decision,
Defendants did not understand that Prinsburg would, or could, challenge any
agreed Findings of Fact." id-1-2. In point of fact, Lender appeals only legal
issues arising from the trial court's memorandum decision; Lender does not
challenge any of the stipulated facts.
Moreover, Guarantors further acknowledged that Lender's "stipuations [to
legal conclusions] were in the nature of an approval as to form of an order." Id.
Oddly, Guarantor's briefing before this court appears to repudiate this prior
acknowledgment. See, e.g., Guarantors' Brief, 22-23 ("Prinsburg Should Not Be
Free to Challenge Stipulated Conclusions of Law.").
The Court of Appeals seized on the language of the Findings that stated
that the Findings "resolved this matter in its entirety," ignoring both the factual
context and the acknowledgments of the parties to the contrary. The issues
presented for appeal were preserved for review. They were first presented to the
trial court for resolution. The Findings were a combined effort to (1) state the
factual predicate of the case-facts which were undisputed for summary judgment
purposes-and, (2) resolve the issues remaining for determination after the
summary judgment decision. The Court of Appeals decision was erroneous and
should be reversed. This matter should be determined on its substantive merits.
-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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II.

The Stipulated Findings Preserved Rather than Precluded Issues for
Appeal
The substantive language of the Stipulated Findings demonstrates both the

Trial Court's error and the preservation of the central issue in this matter. At two
different places, the Stipulated Findings expressly recite that as a result of the
series of transactions Knighton, not Alpine, was the "sole owner" of the collateral
in question. Appendix A, Findings,fflj2, 7. Because at the time of the
disposition of collateral Knighton was the sole owner-as the parties
stipulated-Lender was well within its rights to simply in effect release any security
interests that existed as a result of the Alpine loan and proceed against the
collateral with respect to the Knighton loan. This is precisely what the Lender did.
And it is precisely the set of facts that the Utah Courts have repeatedly
authorized.
Because Guarantors asserted no rights to the collateral in any answer,
Lender was left with two loans, secured by the same collateral. Lender had the
absolute right under the Guaranties to release the security interest in the
collateral which secured the loan Guarantors guaranteed. Lender in effect did
this. Lender then disposed of the collateral under the Knighton loan, applied the
proceeds from that disposition to the Knighton loan and pursued Guarantors
under the Alpine loan. The express terms of the Guaranties allowed exactly this
course of events. Because there was no collateral securing the Alpine loan at
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that point, none of the Article 9 requires for notice and procedural protections
applied to the Alpine Guarantors.
In effect, the Guarantors argue that Lender owed them some duty with
respect to the collateral. This proposition has been repeatedly rejected in Utah.
For example, this Court held that waivers of rights of impairment of collateral,
such as applied in this case, are wholly enforceable Continental Bank & Trust Co.
v. Utah Security Mortgage. Inc.. 701 P.2d 1095,1098 (Utah1985)(holding that a
failure to perfect did not vitiate a guaranty). In Continental Bank. This Court cited
American Bank of Commerce v. Covolo. 540 P.2d 1294 (N.M.1975):
The Bank has the right to 'waive and release' the security at any time
without the waiver or release affecting the Guarantor's obligation to pay.
We find nothing inherently unreasonable in the terms of the guaranty
agreement.... Where a guarantory [sic] or surety expressly and
unequivocally consents to a waiver or release of his rights in collateral, he
will not be heard to complaint about the failure of the guarantee to perfect
the security interest therein in the first instance.
Covolo. 540 P.2d 1298-99. See also Lender's Court of Appeal Opening Brief, 3541. See also Seftel v. Capitol City Bank.767 P.2d 941 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Under these cases, the unconditional Guaranties were fully enforceable against
Guarantors.
Guarantors earnestly assert that the notion of impairment of collateral has
not been raised in this case. In the substantive briefing before the Court of
Appeals, Guarantors made this assertion. In reply, Lender pointed out that the
issue of enforcing the Guaranties was raised below in the Complaint (R.3). In the
-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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briefing on the summary judgment motions, the express waivers of the
Guaranties, the transfer of the Alpine business to Knighton, Alpine's termination
as an entity was raised by both parties. R.407 (Guarantors discussing waivers);
R.509-10 (Lender's discussion of the issue). The ownership of the collateral, the
effect of ownership, the applicability of Article 9 to this matter, all turn on the
effect of the waivers. These issues were raised in the briefing and in the
Findings. Appendix A, Findings,fflf2, 7.
Guarantors now assert they have never broached the idea of a waiver of
impairment defense. To the contrary, at Oral Argument on Summary Judgment,
Defendant's own counsel repeatedly raised the complaint that the Bank's actions
in this case unfairly impaired the Guarantors' rights against collateral. A true and
correct copy of the transcription of the Oral Arguments on Summary Judgment on
26 August 2008 are attached hereto. Exhibit B, Transcript, : 18-25,13:1614:22,21:18-22 :2,28:15-17. The heart of the Guarantors' claim that Article 9
governed this case was the notion that the Guarantors were entitled to notice
under Article 9 and that their rights in the collateral, including the right to recoup
the collateral, or take other actions were impaired by Lender's actions.
Here, the parties squarely put this issue before the trial court. The parties
squarely put the enforceability of the Guaranties before the trial court. The entire
argument that Lender is precluded from recovery because Guarantors were
secondary obligors under Article 9 and entitled to notice turns on the question of
-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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whether the Alpine loan continued as a secured obligation. The simple fact is
that the Lender in effect released the collateral under the Alpine loan, sold the
collateral, and applied the proceeds against the Knighton loan. In so doing,
Lender acted within its rights. The trial court erred in treating this matter as an
Article 9 deficiency case. The Court of Appeals erred in failing to reach the
substantive issue.
Conclusion
The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that any issue had not been
preserved for review. Preservation means providing the trial court with the initial
opportunity to hear and resolve an issue. There is no dispute that the trial court
here had a full, complete and fair opportunity to rule on every aspect of the
enforceability of the Guaranties. Nor is there a claim that Lender waived or
release any appeal rights (except as to the terms of the stipulated facts). The
Court of Appeals erred in failing to reach the merits of this case. This matter
should be resolved on the merits (which have been fully briefed) by this Court or
remanded for resolution on the merits by the Court of Appeals.
Respectfully submitted this J c day of £pf1l, 2012.

Brad C. Smith, Attorney for Prinsburg
State Bank

-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Joel T. Zenger (8926)
MILLER GUYMON, P.C.

165 Regent Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801.363.5600
Facsimile: 801.363.5601

i\.
Attorneys for Defendants Roland E Abundo,
Lindsay T. Atwood, Donald R. Baker, and Jeffrey Gold
^

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

^

;

^

^ic^o^j
.0,

OGDEN DEPARTMENT, WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PRINSBURG STATE .BANK,
Plaintiffs,

1 i 2089
STIPULATED FUNDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
ROLAND E. ABUNDO, LINDSAY T.
ATWOOD, ROBERT THURSTON,
DONALD R. BAKER, JEFFREY'
GOLD, KNIGHTON OPTICAL, INC.
. AND ALPINE VISION, INC.

Civil No. 060901846
.Honorable Scott M. Hadley

Defendants.
Plaintiff Prinsburg State Bank and Defendants Roland E. Abundo, Lindsay T. Atwood,
Donald R. Baker, and "Jeffrey Gold (collectively "Defendants"), by and through their respective
counsel, stipulate to the following findings of fact and conclusions of law, which resolve this
matter in its entirety in favor of Defendants with the exception of a determination of the amount
of reasonable attorneys fees and costs to be awarded Defendants as the prevailing part}'.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

In approximately 1994 Defendant Lindsay Atwood and a business partner formed

Alpine Vision, Inc., which operated a vision care business at a number of locations along the
Wasatch Front.
2.

In or around 19.97 Knighton Optical purchased a majority interest in Alpine Vision

and within a couple of years-was the sole owner of Alpine Vision, including Alpine Vision's
personal property, which included Alpine Visions eye examination equipment.
3.

Knighton Optical .caused Alpine Vision to enter into two loan agreements on March

30, 1998 and August 2771999"wift First Secunty'Bank ("Alpine Vision Loan")JPlaintiff s "
predecessor in interest.
4.

The Alpine Vision Loan totaled $ 150,000, and was secured by Alpine Vision's

equipment, inventor)7, accounts, and general intangibles,
5.

Defendants Atwood, Abundo, and Baker each executed personal guaranties for the

Alpine Vision Loan, on or about July 28,1999.
6.

Although Defendant Gold has no recollection of signing airy guaranty in relation to

the Alpine Vision Loan, for purposes-of resolving this dispute, Defendant Gold stipulates that he
is a guarantor of the Alpine Vision Loan.
7.

On or about February 15, 2001, Knighton Optical purchased the remaining interest

in Alpine Vision and became the sole owner of Alpine Vision's.assets, including the collateral
securing the Alpine Vision Loan.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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"8.

On or about January 24, 2005, Knighton Optical made then last payment on the

Alpine Vision Loan.
9.

In or around late 2006 and without providing notice to Defendants, Plaintiff and

Vision Experts, dba Knighton Vision, held a private disposition of collateral in possession of
Knighton Optical, including the collateral securing the Alpine Vision Loan.
10. No evidence ofthe value ofthe disposed collateral was presented to the Court.
11.

Plaintiff received $80,000 for the property, including the collateral securing the

Alpine Vision Loan, in Knighton Optical5 s possession.
12. No evidence was presented regarding the amount of the disposition proceeds that
were attributable to the Alpine Vision Loan collateral.
13. Plaintiff did not apply any of the proceeds from the private disposition to the Alpine
Vision Loan but, instead, applied the entire amount to Knighton Opticafs debts.
CONCLUSIONS" OF LAW
1.

Article 9'(Secured Transactions) ofthe Uniform Commercial Code as adopted b y

Utah ("Article 9") governs the transactions at issue in this case.
2.

Pursuant to Section 70A-9a-702(l) ofthe Utah Code, the current version of

Article ~9 ofthe UCC applies to Plaintiffs disposition of cdllatarel rather than the version in
effect at the time the guaranties were signed.
3.

Article 9 governs Plaintiffs private disposition ofthe collateral securing the

Alpine Vision Loan.
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4.

Any transfer of the Alpine Vision, collateral to Knighton Optica] did not destroy

the security of the Alpine Vision Loan.
5.

The fact that the guaranties authorized Plaintiff to proceed against the collateral

does not negate Plaintiffs duty to comply with the requirements of Article 9.
6.

Pursuant to 70A-9a-102(71), the Defendants are secondary obligors of the Alpine

Vision Loan,
7.

Pursuant to Section 70A-9a-611(2), as secondary obligors, the Defendants are

entitled to notice of the disposition of any collateral securing the obligation.
...

£.

Therefore-, Plaintiff was required to provide notice loathe Defendants ofthe

private disposition of collateral.
9.

Plaintiff violated Section 70A-9a-611(2) by failing to provide notice ofthe private

disposition of collateral to Defendants.
10.

Pursuant to Section 70A-9a-624, secondary obligors cannot waive their right to

notice until after default ofthe obligations.
• 1L

Defendants did not waive their right to notice after Knighton Optical's default on

the Alpine Vision Loan,
12.

Pursuant to Section"70A-9a-608? any proceeds from the sale ofthe Alpine Vision

Collateral in excess ofthe reasonable expenses of collection and enforcement should have been
applied to the obligation secured by the collateral
13.

Plaintiff failed to apply any ofthe proceeds from the sale ofthe Alpine Vision

Collateral to the Alpine Vision Loan, in violation of Article 9.

4
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14.

Pursuant to Section 70A-9a-610(2). any disposition of collateral must be

performed in a commercially reasonable manner,
15.

If the disposition of collateral is not conducted in a commercially reasonable

manner, the creditor is "barred from recovering a deficiency judgment against any guarantors.
16.

In light of the above facts and conclusions, including the lack of an)' evidence of

the value of the collateral sold, Plaintiffs private disposition of collateral was not conducted in a
commercially reasonable manner and, therefore, Plaintiff is barred from recovering deficiency
judgments from Defendants.
17.

Defendants are the prevailing party .in this lawsuit and pursuant to the attorney fee

provision in the subject guaranties, are entitled to an award of their reasonable attorney fees and ''
costs incurred in defending against Plaintiffs claims.
ADDITIONAL ISSUES
Defendants-shall submit an application for attorney fees for the Court's consideration.
Defendants shall also submit a proposed Final Judgment and Order consistent with these findings
of fact and conclusions of law. The proposed Final Judgment and Order shall not be entered
prior to a determination of the amount of reasonable attorney fees and costs to be awarded
Defendants.
//
//
//
//
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DATED this _ ^ day of

jQjae.

2009.
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

Honorable Scott M. Hadley

SO STIPULATED:
MILLER GUYMON, P.C.

Attorne}^ for Defendants Roland E. Abundo,
Lindsay T. Atwood, Donald R. Baker, and Jeffrey Gold

STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.

Brad C. Smith
Attorneys for Plaintiff Prinsburg State Bank

6
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Transcript of
Summary
Judgment
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-1IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUR1]
OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

-RINS3URG STATE BANK,

)
) Case No. 060901846
ROLAND E. ABUNDO, ei ai,
Defendant.

Hearing
Electronically Recorded on
August 26, 2008

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE SCOTT M. HADLEY
Second District Court Judae

APPEARANCES

For the Plaintifj

Brad C. Smith
STEVENSON & SMITH
3986 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, UT 84403
Telephone: (801)399-9910

For the Defendant:

Blake D. Miller
LEGAL DEFENDER'S ASSOCIATION
424 E. 500 S. #300
SLC, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)532-544 4

Transcribed bv: Natal is

J a K. e ,• \^*^j.

152 Katresha St.
Grantsville, UT 84029
Telephone: (435) 59 0-5575
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P E C O

E E P I N G S

(Electronically recorded on August 26, 2 0 08)
THE COURT:

Folks, are you ready on the Prinsburg

State

Bank matter?
MR. MILLER:

Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT:
case.

I've given you plenty of Lime to settle the

I'll take a settlement proposal if you want.
MR. MILLER:

We didn't get there, your Honor.

THE COURT:

You wasted the time; is that what you're

telling me?
MR. MILLER:

It (inaudible).

THE COURT:

Was it Mr. Smith, was he the problem?

MR. SMITH:

As usual.

THE COURT:

We just have a presumption here.

know if you were aware of it.
are we ready to go?

Okay.

I didn't

I'm teasing, Mr. Smith, but

Do you want me to call this case, or do you

want to, Venna, who we welcome?
COURT CLERK:
THE COURT:

Do you have it there?

COURT CLERK:
THE COURT:

THE COURT:

Do you want me to?
Yeah, if you've got it, go ahead.

COURT CLERK:
case No. 06091846.

I'm happy to.

This is the time set for oral argument,

It is Prinsburg vs Abundo, et al.
Okay.

We have attorney Brae: Smith appearing

on behalf of the u l a m t i f f , and Counsel, I'll have to ash you tc
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make your appearances.
MR. MILLER:

i torae: wno is wno.
Ir is Elai:e Miller and Joel Lenger for

defendants Abunac, Atwcod, Tnurston, BaKer anc Dr. Gold.
THE COURT:
MR. MILLER:
so thank you.

Okay.
I'm sorry, I'm correct, it's not Thurston,

Everyone else I indicated but him.

THE COURT:

Okay.

This is the time set for -- as

Venna mentioned -- oral arguments on really cross motions for
summary judgment, the first being filed by the plaintiff.

As I

understand it, that motion is being withdrawn, and I've lost my
note, but I think it was to Mr. Baker, wasn't it?
MR. MILLER:

Gold.

MR. SMITH:

To Mr. Gold.

THE COURT:

Gold.

MR. SMITH:

Dr. Gold.

THE COURT:

For the -- because of an admitted factual

dispute as to whether he signed the guarantee, correct?
MR. SMITH:

That is correct, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Okay.

So this, insofar as the plaintiff is

concerned, is a motion for summary judgment regarding defendant
Abundc, Atwood and -MR. SMITH:

Baker.

THE COURT:

-- Baker, not Thurston or Gold or Knighton

Ootical cr A l o m e Vision, correct?
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-4THE COURT:
the other way.

Okay.

Then there's a cross motion that goes

Now I've received all of these documents from tne

aeiendants in this spiffy binder, and I'm assuminc these are all
courtesy copies; is that right?
MR. MILLER:
THE COURT:
MR. MILLER:
THE COURT:
MR. MILLER:
THE COURT:

They are, your Honor.
So I can write on these, right?
Absolutely.
Okay.
You absolutely can.
Because if they are that way then I tend to

keep my notes on them, so I appreciate that and thank you for
that.

I just wanted to make sure you didn't want them filed

because my secret notes will go in there, so -MR. MILLER:

One more matter, your Honor, there's also a

motion to amend, your Honor, with respect to the -THE COURT:

Oh, yes, thank you, there is.

and I wanted to address that first.

There's a --

There's a motion to file an

amended answer by the defendants, and that looks right.

I didn't

know that, frankly, until late yesterday, so

I've -- I quickly

read the documents in relationship to that.

Let me ask both

sides a question with that.

If that motion were granted -- well,

either way, does that -- the ruling on that motion affect the
cross motions for summary judgment?
MR. SMITH:

I think the other way around.

I think a

ruiino in our favor on the summary luacrment would obviate the
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need for the amended -- the amendment, but the ruling on the
amendment would not I think affect the summary judgment motions.
MR. MILLER:

That's probably why I think -- as I

understand the bank's principle defense to tne amendment is
futility, and that amendment qoes to the heart of the motion for
summary judgment.

So if you rule against the defendants then

there would be an argument it would be futile.
THE COURT:

On the motion for summary judgment, right?

If I ruled against the defendants on that.
MR. MILLER:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. MILLER:

Other than that, I -- it is the central

heart of what we're talking about.
THE COURT:

That's what it seemed like.

It seems like

the motion for summary judgments, I could get to the substance of
those regardless of how I ruled on the motion to -- for leave to
file the amended answer.
MR. MILLER:
other.

I have no objection having addressed the

It probably makes sense.
THE COURT:

The motions for summary judgments, the cross

motions?
MR. MILLER:

Right, and the motion -- or we can

(inaudible) that first and the motion to amend.

It probably

would help to do the motions for summary judgment first, your
Honor .

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

THE COURT:

Okay.

That's what I wondered, because

oftentimes it -- there's a motion for leave to file the amended
answer tc correct some defect that's been found, you know, and i
arises when a motion for summary judgment has been filed.
doesn't appear to be the case here.

That

It seems like the substance

of these arguments survive either way.
• MR. MILLER:

I believe so, but it clarifies the record

with respect to one notice issue.
THE COURT:

Yeah.

Okay.

I do have to leave, folks, at 5.

Can we spend the time then -I can't go past 5, and I'm

hoping you won't get close to that, but -MR. MILLER:

Well, we can just have the defendants

speak, your Honor, and I'll be happy to -THE COURT:

That would save some time, thank you.

MP,. SMITH:

I hope that's not an invitation for each of

us to spend 35 minutes.
THE COURT:

No, that's why I kind of put the little

disclaimer at the end.

I don't mean for you to take it clear to

then, but I just wanted to put a cap on it, too.
that.

I'm sorry for

I do want you to spend what time you need, but I hope it

doesn't go beyond that.

Okay.

So we'll start with the motions

for summary judgment, and are you ready, Mr. Smith?
MR. SMITH:

I am, your Honor.

THE COURT:

I thought we'll each aet two turns,
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MR. SMITH:

Your Honor, very briefly, :o emphasi:
with, i don't believe there are

couple of fact issues to b e a m

inv aenuine issues or aisputed material tact
is

no

CISPU:

that in '98 and

x

. s case.

:ne r•

99 my client's predecesso:

interest, First Security Bank, made loans to Alpine Vision.
The 1999 interration

(phonetic) of those loans included the

commercial guarantees that are at the heart of this case.
In 2001 -- pardon me.

On a parallel track, First

Security Bank also made loans to Knighton Optical at a time when
Knighton and Alpine were separately distinct, non-affiliated
corporations.
In 2001, without involving the bank -- and I'm just
going to refer to the bank to mean First Security Bank and now
my present client, Prinsburg State Bank, who acquired First
Security's interest -- Alpine and Knighton entered into a
transaction without inviting the bank to be involved that set in
course a couple of important issues.

An agreement was signed by,

among others, defendants Atwood, Gold, Baker and Thurston in
which ail of their stock interests in Alpine were transferred to
Knighton, and Knighton assumed and was aoie to exercise control
and dominion over ail of Alpine's assets.
Knighton agreed as part of that transaction to hold
those shareholders harmless on any of Alpine's indebtedness,
which presumably would have included trie loan that is aaair. at
the heart of the present dispute.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-8Knighton makes payments on all of the indebtedness -the Knighton indebtedness and ~he Alpine indebtedness -- until
some point in 2 0 0 5 or 2006.

The principals of Kniahton have

subsequently filed bankruptcy, and Knighton itself -- Knighton
Optical, in any event, is now a defunct corporation.
As the bank is attempting to work through that
situation, the collateral which

initially was collateral for the

Alpine loan, but it has ceased to be Alpine collateral because
Alpine has ceased to exist, is sold and the proceeds of that sale
of collateral are applied against the Knighton indebtedness.

Now

there's nothing in any of the documents that precludes that from
occurring.

Indeed, the commercial guarantees contemplate that

exact thing -- that that exact thing may happen by specifically
providing that the guarantor's obligations under the commercial
guarantees will survive a modification of the underlying
obligation by the bank, including the release of collateral.
It's our position, therefore, that this lawsuit has
nothing to do with Article 9, and therefore, none of the
provisions regarding notice and the various protections that
are in revised Article 9 have any application.

As soon as

Article 9 is taken out of the mix, we are then simply left with a
straightforward contract case involving the interpretation of the
continuing -- pardon me, of the commercial guarantees.

I don't

think there's any dispute that the commercial guarantees provide
a brGac legal obligation on the part of the guarantors to
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guarantee not mere payment -- or net mere collection, but to
quaraniee payment tc my client.

In that sense the case 15

indistinguishable from the Stravell Patterson case which we cite.
This is a situation m

which the guarantees were

expressly written in a broad, broad fashion to obligate the
Guarantors to pay, irrespective of whether my clients exhausted
collateral or didn't exhaust collateral, whether the loan was
modified or not, and they expressly waived the right to complain
if any of those things occurred.
The rub comes in in the defendant's claim that there
is somehow an obligation on my client's part to either keep the
Alpine collateral segregated once this merger occurred, or to
somehow proceed first against the Alpine collateral.

The

problem with that argument is in our estimation at least twofold.
First -- threefold.
First, there's no such obligation in any loan document
that can be pointed to.

Second, it's expressly contrary to the

very thing the guarantors are guaranteeing, and expressly
contrary to the very conditions that the guarantors waived when
they signed the commercial guarantees.
Third and most important in my mind, however, your
Honor, is this.

This is a commercial transaction.

defendants are all professionals.

The

This is not a consumer

ransacticr. with a Dan.»: ovei -weamnc someooav Duvmc; a
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OillC__

_- C. _

-10transactions vatn Droiessionais
They/ without inviting the bani: to the party, decided tc
merge the two companies.

At that point the defendants and the

defendants alone were what you might call the least cost avoiders
of this problem.

It would have been a simple matter for them to

call out the collateral, or to impose some obligation on Knighton
to keep the collateral segregated, or to take some other action
to protect'themselves, or to put the bank on notice that we are
no longer guaranteeing these matters or to attempt to revoke
their commercial guarantees, or any number of other commercially
feasible actions.
Instead what they did was they sold Alpine to Knighton
for their own reasons, for their own profit, upon their own
agreed terms, and subject to their own contractual
without notifying the bank.

obligations

So long after they've taken

advantage -- and I don't mean that in any pejorative sense, but
long after they've received the commercial advantage of their
transaction, their argument is basically that they should be able
to pull apart the strands of the transaction and say, "Well, we
should receive the benefits of our transaction and we should be
relieved from the burdens."
I don't believe it works anything like that.
signed commercial guarantees.

They

By the time it came to enforce

those guarantees the collateral was effectively exhausted, die
not exist, at least not in the name that it then -- at least not
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in the name of Alpine a: that point, and they're left with the
obligations owing unaer tne_r commercial guarantees.
One otner matter tnat ~ would observe that Z tnink
not been briefed by either party, nowever, ario it is simply tnis

believe there's a substantial amount of legal work that will need
7

I to be done because of course this transaction happens to straddle

8

I the effective date of revised Article 9.

9

I guarantees and the loan transactions that they relate to were

10

The commercial

I entered into prior to the effective date of revised Article 9,

11

and there is some substantial work that would probably need to be

12

done to determine whether revised Article 9 would govern the

13

transaction.

14

The application of revised Article 9 I think is the

15

defendant's primary defense, at least to the summary judgment

16

motion that we've filed and that the primary item advanced in

17

their motion for summary judgment.

18

things as we address that.

19

that the private disposition of collateral that occurred occurred

20

without notice to these guarantors.

Let me simplify a couple of

I don't believe there's any dispute

The degree to which that

! 1 J affects rights and obligations under either preexisting Article 9
or revised Article 9 is a matter of some question to me, but
there's no dispute that thev were not criven notice of the private
Lispositior. c:

.^atera_.
Alpine Vision, though it was no longer an
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entity in existence at the time was given notice, but the
However, as. indicated, J don't

individual guarantors were not.

believe Article 9 has application in this matter for the reasons
articulated in our brief and that I've adaressed to the Court.
Excuse me.

Unless the Court has any questions for me, I'll sit

down well short of my 35 minutes.
THE COURT:

Okay.

I don't at this point.

Thank you.

Mr. Miller, before I hear from you, let me just finish this note.
MR. MILLER:
THE COURT:
MR. MILLER:

Sure.
Okay.

I'm

ready.

Your Honor, the law requires that lenders

who take collateral, hold collateral, and/or sell collateral do
certain things, and the terms of written guarantees cannot change
those obligations, they're as follows.

First, if the lender

wants to foreclose the collateral, it must give notice of sale to
those from which it will -- from whom it will seek a deficiency,
both primary and secondary obligors, such as guarantors.
The purpose of that is to allow those parties the
opportunity to protect their rights, this under existing law for
years predating revised Article 9, and Counsel is right, this
wasn't briefed by either party, but I think it's clear, these
provisions, under 9504 are the old Article 9 that I used to live
with all the time is the same.
cannot be waived in a guarantee.

You need to give notice, and it
It car., only be waived post

default.
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jecond,
wnetner

vou r e

the
aoino

sale

must
LOOI:

joe

commerc:
95 0

Unaer

s designee
tne value
:,

if

c:

that's

the proceeds.

the

collateral.

what

vou d e c i d e

Third,

you've

to

you've

do;

You can't just keep them.

to

rea.

got
account icr

Again, the law is the

same under old Article 9 and new Article 9.
The undisputed facts are that Prinsburg Bank did none o:
9

I these.

Let's talk about the notice of sale.

Utah law consistent

10

| with all other states who have adopted the Uniform Commercial

11

I Code requires that notice of disposition of collateral be given

12

to the debtor and all secondary obliqors and the guarantor is a

13

secondary obligor.

14

Revised Article 9 in Section 70A-9A-611,

I don't have in mind the old version.

I think it's 902 of the

.5 I code, but it's been too many years now.

I've probably forgotten,

16

I

This allows guarantors to pay the debt and redeem the

17

| collateral, or get others to come to the sale and purchase it for
value.

1 °>

Let's talk about the nature of the deal here.

guarantees a debt, one does it as part of a package.

When one
The lender

2 0 I takes collateral and the guarantors who have aareed in an
unconditional guarantee -- and this is typical,
.uenaer, vou can ac a a a m s t me
collateral.

stanaara,

;ou can reiease tne

You can -- back to the debtor, by the way

. UU

maKe me ua\

:>ay it n r s t , nowever, _ am
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wC

-14subrogated to the rights of the lender in that collateral.

Now I

have the collateral and I can enforce it 'against the debtor.
So the secondary obligor such as the guarantor has to
pay his guarantee, he has the lender's rights in the collateral.
If it's released to the debtor, the debtor still has it, the
guarantor has its rights against the debtor.
collateral value is maintained.

Either way this

It is true, the lender -- and

most of your unconditional guarantees will say, "Well, we don't
know if we're going to go against the collateral or not.

We

reserve that right.

We can release it.

first."

The collateral -- you can't take the

It's true.

We can go after you

collateral, sell it and then not apply it.

It has a choice.

So a guarantor entering into these understands that
it can seek -- if it watches, it can seek the value of the
collateral.

In this -- that notice that it must be provided

under pre and post revised Article 9 cannot be waived.

In fact,

under 624 of revised Article 9 -- and by the way, it was
effective as of the day they were trying to enforce these rights.
The security agreement may have predated it, but the enforcement
rights were pursuant to revised Article 9.

It says a waiver of

the notification of disposition of collateral must be entered
into and authenticated after default.
So

:ontained in the Guarantee and

;ne iende:

is relying or. that language in the guarantee as Prinsburg Ban]
in this case, it is by law clearly insufficient.

The waivers
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thev are c i a i m m c to reiy or. trie guarantee simply nave no
e::ec: as to nc

Oci:;

l>t:

to give notice, the Utah law has
ciear on t m s

ino I rrobablv have the case wronc.

since

case I lived with for years, 1978 or
vs. Pro P r i m e r s .
03.

x

The

79, the case of ?MA Leasing

In fact, the cite of that will be 590 P. 2 d

You don't give notice, you don't collect the deficiency.

9

Now there's a subsequent case by the Utah Supreme Court,

10

it's the Quinn case.

The Quinn case did back off that slightly.

11

In Quinn it was a used car sales case.

12

the collateral was woefully inadequate to ever satisfy the debt.

13

It was also undisputed that it was done commercially reasonable,

There was no dispute that

14

J the actual sale.

13

| because of those facts.

16

I years, long before revised Article 9 came into effect this

17

I decade, and that is if you don't give notice of disposition of

18

| collateral then you made an election not to seek a deficiency

19
20

The Court cut the lender a break in that case
Utah law has been consistent for 30

The sale must also be commercially reasonable.
sale was not advertised by the bank.
bank.
cnmK

What occurred
it comes out

This

It was not marketed to the

need to aive

ttie History nere.

the statement or tacts.

re's a comoanv known as Kniahtor. Or

:nree D r a i n e r s ,
:artec to f a l t e r ,

. -_ _ a. _ .

m n e n c e c iron: t n e i r

one of t h e c r o o n e r s ,
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Dan

Knighton, wanted to continue with his wife and tnev started
Led Knightor. Vision.
:nat tne DanJ: saia,

_ n e,

What ir. essence occurred was

taKe

a _ _ t n i s c o _ ± a t e r a.

: n e t. i p I n e

loan collateral, everything else, run it, make payments to me and
then buy it."

Knighton Vision made payments and bought it, but

none of those proceeds were ever credited on the Alpine loan.
Instead they've brought the action against the guarantor saying,
"Forget the collateral, forget the money we got on that.

You pay

me the old balance, and you pay it to me now."
Now maybe it makes sense for the bank to convert all
this over to Knighton Vision.

The Knighton Optical debts the

bank owed dwarfed the Alpine Vision loan.

It just dwarfed them.

So maybe it made sense for the bank to say, you know, we're going
to put our eggs in the Knighton Vision basket.

We're going to

allow Knighton's family to continue to operate the business, and
that's better for us.

We'd rather have a performing loan from

Knighton and forget about Alpine Vision.

That could have been

what their decision was.
It doesn't matter why, but the fact is it was their
decision.

The minute they sold us to the new Knighton entity and

a lot of continuation of -- and redid those loans and sold that
collateral without notice in a non-commercial reasonable manner,
they made a decision, affirmative or otherwise, to release Alpine
and tc release all secondary obligors.
Now let's talk about this supposed sale from Alpine to
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ever. get. to this situation is because by coincidence, First
Security Bank was the lender of Alpine and also separately the
lender of Knighton Optical.

They were independent companies when

they entered into those deals.
There came a time -- yeah, they're in the same business.
They're aware of each other.

They are competitors.

Optical buys the stock of Alpine.
buys the stock.
apparent.

Knighton

It doesn't buy the assets, it

If you look at Exhibit U that's painfully

It talks about all the stock of Alpine Vision being

acquired by Knighton Optical, Inc., and that the shareholders
shall surrender the entire stock of Alpine Vision to Knighton
Optical.
Paragraph 7, "In transfer of the stock of A.lpine vision
by its shareholders to Knighton Optical."
sale.

What -- it was a stock

A stock sale does not transfer and change the character or

the ownership of the assets.

They were owned by Alpine Vision

before the sale of its stock, and they were owned after the sale
of the stock by Alpine Vision.

It is true, control of that

assets derivatively through the stock was now controlled bv the
Knighton Optical principals.
The Alpine entity, though, continued.

In fact, if you
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sven sued them in this case as a separate company.

Never has

m e r e Deer a merger; a SZOCJ: sale was ai^ it. was
riven n

mere, n a c Deen

it nac,

security interest of the bank is not altered.

a merger, :nt
The security

interest in the Alpine loan collateral continues through anv
merger or sale.
merger.

You can't defeat a bank security interest by a

It continues.

It's up to the bank to enforce it or not,

but that security interest, even if a merger, even if an asset
sale would have continued in favor or Prinsburg bank.
Now Prinsburg says well -- and because that security
interest remained, Prinsburg has obligations under Article 9 as
a holder of collateral.

I must -- I can only sell it in a

commercially reasonable manner if I choose to sell it, or I can
release it back to the debtor in accordance with Article 9, but
none of that was done.
This wasn't released back to Alpine, it was sold,
proceeds were received and nothing credited to Alpine.

Alpine --

the loan of Alpine, Prinsburg just ignored when it came to
allocating any proceeds.

This stuff wasn't worthless.

This was

the optical equipment that would get going to a doctor's office
or lab to get your -- the lenses cut, slit lenses, your lights.
When you sit down at a doctor's office to have your eye examined
and looking at the kind of equipment we're talking about here,
uius the lab eauiDmen: in the back to make tne qlasses.
It's undisDutec tne tax aeDreciatea DOOJC oasis c: tnese
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-1 Q.
asseis was

not fair market value, but

on m e

nooks tne1

aerre::a:?
DaSIS,

:imes tne amour.; or tne ^.itine

W £ S W O 1" t l

You're a guarantor, you'd feel pretty secure saying, "Well, 1 may
have to pay off my guarantee, bur I've got collateral here.

Once

6

released to the debtor or I'm subrogated into his shoes, I can

7

take care of this.

8

Because no notice was ever given to these guarantors they were

9

never -- they were deprived of that opportunity.

10
11

It's worth five times at least the debt."

As I said, the reason we even get to this point is the
coincidence that First Security Bank was the lender of Alpine
pre-stock sale and was also the lender of Knighton Optical.

13

Let's think what would happen if there were two different

14

lenders, and I'll just pick on a bank -- this is one I dealt

15

with this morning.

16

Wells Fargo is the lender on Knighton Optical.

17

Bank of the West is the Alpine lender and

When those stock sale comes over and Knighton now runs

18

the business of Alpine, Bank of the West doesn't lose it security

19

interest.

20

it's just gone.

Bank of the West doesn't say, "Oh, there's a merger,
I can't complain now, I guess it's just over."

Bank of the West security interest is as fully enforceable as it
ever was, and there might even be a provision in their loan
documents that say, "Alpine, you breached by doina an asset
0£

oome are, some

ion't even know

in nere Decause we're so car Devona tnat, it no ionqer
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matters.
Tne key is, simply because

it's the same lender on the

Alpine side and en the Knighton Optical siae doesn't mean they
can ignore -- just because they want to -- Alpine loan.
separate company.

It's a

It has its own assets, and they're trying to

enforce its own guarantee.

My three clients did not guarantee

Knighton Optical's debt, only Alpine Vision's debt.

If they've

merged it, given it up, released it, whatever, a guarantee only
guarantees a principal obligation.

If the principal obligation

is gone, the guarantee goes away as well.
What happens under Utah law if a creditor/lender takes
the decision, "I'm not going to release collateral, I will
actually go sell it," and I do a disposition of collateral, I
don't even think it can be reasonably disputed when that decision
is made Article 9 governs.

That's what Article 9 says.

You

dispose of collateral, you must comply with Article 9.
Yes, the bank Could have decided not to do that and not
be bound by the commercial reasonableness or notice requirements,
but it chose to sell it.

The minute it made that affirmative

decision it incurred the obligations.

Utah law -- the Kagus case

cited in our briefs just like no notice, no deficiency, this is
also a guarantor case, your Honor, and also pre revised Article
9.

You sell it in a non-commercial reasonable manner without

notice, you've waived your deficiency.

We'll let you keep tne

collateral, let you keep the proceeds of the sale, but you're not
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-21acing arte: tne guarantors ior any more money, anc you re not
aoinq after tne debtor for any more money, whicn is wnat tne bank
is trying to do here.
Third ooiigation, tne bank must account for tne
proceeds.

Your Honor, it seems like a fairly simple proposition

that when a lender sells collateral, receives money, it ought to
be applied to the loan and reduce the balance.

"We don't have to

rely on that simple proposition because Article 9, again dealing
with when you sell collateral, says exactly that.
608.

That's 78A-9A-

You apply it first to the expenses of the sale, then to the

balance.
It's also undisputed, though, your Honor, that Prinsburg
has never credited a dime from its disposition of the Alpine
collateral toward the Alpine loan.

Not a dime.

the guarantors to pay the full amount.
this stuff.

It doesn't care.

It rather wants

Its got paid on some of

It wants to be paid double.

It's

in essence enforcing a double payment.
They got paid from the collateral and now wants to be
paid from the guarantors, and that's not wnat a guarantee is.
guarantee says bank, you make a choice.

A

You go after me first if

you would like, I step into your shoes, but you don't sell the
collateral, keep the proceeds and then sue me.

I'm scrrv, vour
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-??sold the collateral, but never -- still seeking the original
p rin ciP a _ amount.
. n e case _,_aw is

z±ear vour Hcncr,

burden to establish how much is due.

tne l e n a e r s

Tne lender has tc come in

5

I and show by undisputed facts here's how much was due.

6

I know is they sold collateral, they didn't attribute any of it to

7

I the debt, it was sold without notice and it was sold in a noncommercially reasonable manner.

9

As far as their motion for

summary judgment, they can't even meet the first element, which

10
11

All

is how much is due on the principal obligation for which the
I guarantee is sought.

12 I

Your Honor, if it would be helpful, maybe this is a good

13

time just to address quickly the motion to amend because 1 think

14

it ties in here.

If that's -- with your permission.

15 |

THE COURT:

16 I

MR. MILLER:

Uh-huh.
The motion to amend -- well, what had

17

happened is I believe this action started in April of 2006.

18

replacement Counsel, so I'm going back on my record.

19

was done a couple of months later.

20

I collateral in August of 2006.

I'm

The answer

The bank then sold the Alpine

This is the without -- the no

notice, the not commercially reasonable sale.
So it was in the context of discovery, these guarantors,
because they weren't criven notice -- there's no dispute they
w e r e r:

Tnev nac. nc ciue wnat naopenec
it was the context of discovery when they said
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-23basically what happened to ail this stuff, they got a copy of the
notice of disposition, found out wnat happened, and in the course
of tne action they discovered tnis aefense and moved to amend.
If you're looking at amendment, there is no dispute as
to the facts.

No notice was given, and that's all that amendment

seeks is you didn't give us notice.

It arose after the complaint

was filed, and if you look at the requirements of Rule 15, it
says when justice so requires, this was something that was only
within the bank's knowledge.
tell us.

We didn't know because they didn't

We didn't know they sold it because they didn't tell

us, and the reason we didn't know they didn't sell it
because we didn't have notice.
without discovery.

(inaudible)

We couldn't have found out

The bank wasn't volunteering it.

So justice requires that in the course of litigation, an
event that occurs during litigation that has an impact on the
case, you ought to be able to amend.
The second and probably most important thing is is there
a prejudice to the other party, and there can be none in this
case.

There's no more discovery that needs to be done.

Counsel

itself admitted it's an undisputed fact, and that's all it is.
They didn't give us notice.
200 6.

They've known this since August of

It took us longer to discover it, but they've known this

forever.

We didn't know it.

Thev do.

There's no more discovery
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-2 4So your Honor, we think the motion to amend should be
granted.

The bank has mace ; L S decision.

not to release the collateral.

The bank nas decided

Trie bank decided not tc otherwise

release its interest in the collateral but no enforce that
collateral riernes under Article

9 of the code.

The minute it

made that decision it too): upon itself ail of the obligations of
a secured lender under Article

9.

Those are without question.

You give notice, you sell it in a commercially reasonable manner,
and you account for the proceeds.

Not a single one of those was

done .
The law is clear that failure to do even one of these
results in a no deficiency.
their proceeds.
Vision.

They get to keep their collateral or

They get to keep their new deal with Knighton

All of that we're not asking to be set aside, but they

have waived and are barred by seeking further payments from
either Alpine Vision or the guarantors.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you.

Thank you.
Final reply from your

end, Mr. Smith?
MR. SMITH:

First of all, your Honor, let me address

something Mr. Miller indicated that the bank hasn't even
indicated what amount is due.

I would indicate we have done so,

and the defendants have electee not to dispute the amount due.
There is no dispute here that the proceeds that were received
from the sale of collateral were applied to the Knighton loan.
So when Counsel speaks of a double recovery, that just simply is
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an incorrect assertion.
Wine:

•-.' C _

There is no aouiue recovery nere,

'_ ,

out _ p a r t w a v s v:::r. . o u n s e ^

Counsel's anaivs:
the beginning of his argument.

at

He starts with the proposition

that the collateral in question at the time of its disposition
was Alpine collateral, and that there was somehow an obligation
on the bank's part to continue to treat that collateral
separately.

The chronology of what happened in this case

demonstrates that the bank made no such election.

The bank

10

commences this action to enforce the commercial guarantees, and

11

then months later disposes of the collateral and applies the

12

proceeds of that disposal against the Knighton loan.

13

Alpine had years previous ceased to exist as an entity.

14

So Counsel is correct when he says in

15

rime frame was, when the parries -- the defendants and Knighton

16

and Alpine entered into the stock purchase agreement, that it was

17

a stock agreement, not an asset purchase agreement, that is

18

correct.

19

2002 --. again, an undisputed fact here -- Alpine ceased to have

20

legal existence.

x

98 or ^99, whatever the

Alpine did not maintain its corporate existence, and by

So what von

.v nave is tne commercial guarantors

having set up a cnain of events, ana now really they are saying,
"well, we somehow want to assert rights that are Knighton's

terms and procedures of the -- of Article 9," but thev cease --
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-26the company itself ceased no exist.
Alpine at that point:.
Knight or..

There was no ownership by

It had beer: hopelessly cc-minalec with

At the eno of the transaction that trie defendants set

in motion -- not Prinsburg and not First Security -- at the end
of thai there's one company that holds evervthinc.
Now Counsel is correct that in and of itself that stock
purchase agreement may not have been sufficient to transfer
title.

I don't really particularly disagree with that.

That

isn't what we are saying, however, because that's not the entire
story that happened here.

It's the at the stock purchase

agreement in '99 -- Exhibit U -- pardon me, 2001 is when that
was.

It's the stock purchase agreement coupled with Knighton's

co-mingling of the assets coupled with Alpine's forfeiture of its
corporate charter coupled with Knighton's assumption of the debt
coupled with Knighton's payment over time coupled with Knighton's
agreement to indemnify these defendants, all of that taken
together effectively put that collateral as Knighton collateral.
Indeed Counsel may be correct that at some point in
time First Security Bank or Prinsburg may have had a claim
against Alpine for impairment of collateral.

That may well be,

and of course, who would be the obligated parties in that case?
Presumably the shareholders that allowed, the impair -- or
directors or officers who allowed the impairment to occur who are
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I don't

disagree

w i t h Mr. M.

snt n a s som*
our i ' C s : : : o r . ,

:ne wav m e

parties

c i i s p o s e c or

nowever,

giveii

., given tn-E

t^e

chronology of events, "here is no application for Artie
O.

U U Q i C L l l _:

6

liable.

7

debt to Knighton, and the proceeds from the disposition of

8

collateral were applied against that loan.

9

There is no double recovery because there was the other

With respect to the motion to amend, 1 think given

10

Mr. Miller's presentation and mine, it's rather apparent to the

11

Court, depending on how you resolve the summary judgment motion,

12

it seems to me that the motion to amend rises or fails on that.

13

If the motion for summary judgment is granted in favor of

14

Prinsburg, then the amended complaint would be futile, and

15

therefore the motion to amend should be denied.

16

summary judgment is granted in favor of the defendants, or

17

alternatively I think I would concede if the Court simply denies

18

both motions for summary judgment then the amendment should

19

probably be allowed.

20

would -- I'll

If judgment --

Unless the Court has any questions, that

submit the matter.

THE COURT:
MR. MILLER:
THE COURT:

Okay.

I don't.

Thank you.

Briefly respond, your Honor?
Okav.

Yes.
nave vcu out or nere

)ien:v c••:

2D
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-28THE COURT:

Yeah.

Mr.. MILLER:
a co-mingling.

First, your Honor, m e r e

is no evidence of

In fact, the evidence nas been contrary tnat the

parties, Knighton Optical, even though it owned the stock of

assets owned by Alpine and Knighton.

If you look at Exhibit 11

to -- I'IP sorry -MR. SMITH:

It would be Prinsburg's reply memorandum.

MR. MILLER:

Exhibit 11 to Prinsburg's reply memorandum,

they set forth one of these listing of inventories.

You'll see

in there that they first talk about Knighton Optical's, and then
at the end -- I better grab my glasses to make sure I'm right
here -- it lists Alpine equipment under Alpine equipment, and
then itemizes it by item.
a stock sale.

This was never co-mingled.

It was

And even -- again, even if it had been somehow

merged and Alpine had gone out of business, the security interest
survives, and that's the key.
Because here's the rub, your Honor.

All that doesn't

matter unless the lender decides to enforce its collateral
rights.

The minute the lender makes that decision he's bound by

Article 9.

That's exactly what happened here.

If you look at

the notice of disposition of collateral, which is attached to I
think our memorandum as wells as Prinsburg, it clearly is a UCC
Arcicle S- notice.

It's even titled, "Notification of private

disposition of collateral."

Wnen you're oisposinc of collateral,
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-29yo\j have obligated yourself to do in in accordance with Article

It references trie debtor.

It references from secured

party who is enforcing this collateral rights, Prinsburg State

talks about when it will sell it.

You know what, it even is

giving notice to this entity they claim no longer exists, Alpine
Vision.

It's on the certificate of service, although my clients

are not.
So the bank is saying, "We're not bound by Article 9."
They give an Article 9 notice.

They grab the stuff, they sell

it, and here's where we get in dispute.
because of this.

It is a double recovery

The minute they take collateral they have a

security interest in Alpine -- the Alpine loan.

Whoever now owns

it, because their security interest passes through.

It survives

changes of ownership unless it's sold in a commercial -- or a
retail sale to a bona fide purchaser for value, which none of
this was.
The minute they try to enforce that security agreement,
they've got to allocate the proceeds to the loan for which its
I secured.

That's the key.

You've got to take -- if you're aoing

to force tnat collateral, it's got to be the loan against which
it was secured, 611 of the code.

They've acknowledged, "We

didn't do tnat loan, we did this loan.

We took tne orcceeds here

j

and applied it to the Knighton Optical loan, so you don't get the
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-30
benefit of the guarantors.

We iooJ; the collateral that secured

the loan that you guaranteed and paid off this 1 o a r. .
problem with that?"

Got a

Of course we do.

Had they done it right, had they given us notice, there
would be no deficiency.

They are gettine a double recovery i:

they took collateral that should have been applied to Alpine
Vision loan, applied it to a separate loan, and then they're
tying to get the guarantors to pay the entire amount.
double recovery.

Thank you.

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. MILLER:
mistake.

That is a

Let me just finish this thought.

Your Honor, I've been told I made a

The asset list of independent

(inaudible) Alpine's is

Exhibit 11 to the guarantor's memorandum in support of their
motion for summary judgment.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. MILLER:
as to the original
THE COURT:
folks.

I think I identified 'it as the reply memo

(inaudible).
Okay.

Thank you.

Well, thank you both

It's too late and it's too close of a question for me to

issue the ruling now, so I'm going to take it under advisement.
I've got 60 days.

I hope it doesn't take me that lone to do it,

but -MR. SMITH:

Is this one you think will improve with

time, your Honor?
THE COURT:

I think it will.

This one is the fine line
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cateqorv
Oi:a v .

It should ae; bezzer
m e r e anv-nine e_se

as we qet closer -c zhe

6C

nov., :nouqL

evervininq * neeo;
MR. MILLER:

I believe so, your Konoi
!j:ay .

J. dciudi.y may nave mor- ~r.ar- i neeo.

Anything else?
MR. SMITH:

Nothing that I have, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Okay.

very well argued.

10

hat.

Thank you, folks.

Very well briefed,

You've made it very difficult.

Good lawyering, thouqh.

Thank you both.

Thank you for
We'll adjourn.

(Hearing concluded)
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